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WEST VIRGINIA
LAW REVIEW
Volume 55 December, 1952 Number 1
CORRECTION OF ERROR ON MOTION
LEO CARMIN*
T HREE sections in the West Virginia Code, with the aid of a
fourth, have substantially modified the common law and equity
methods of reviewing judgments and decrees. Their object is,
within certain specified limits, to substitute a motion in the trial
court for a writ of error or an appeal. Two of these sections deal
with clerical error, or error in fact. One of the two reads as follows.
"For any clerical error or error in fact for which a judg-
ment or decree may be reversed or corrected on writ of error
coram nobis, the same may be reversed or corrected, on motion
after reasonable notice, by the court, or by the judge thereof
in vacation." -
The other, to the extent that it is pertinent to the present
discussion, reads as follows.
"A court in which is rendered a judgment or decree in a
cause wherein there is in a declaration or pleading, or in the
record of the judgment or decree, any mistake, miscalculation,
or misrecital of any name, sum, quantity or time, when the
same is right in any part of the record or proceedings, or when
there is any verdict, report of a commissioner, bond, or other
writing, whereby such judgment or decree may be safely
amended, or in which a judgment is rendered on a forthcoming
bond for a sum larger than by the execution or order of sale
appears to be proper, or on a verdict in an action for more
damages than are mentioned in the declaration, may, or, in the
vacation of the court in which any such judgment or decree is
rendered, the judge thereof may, on motion of any party,
amend such judgment or decree according to the truth and
justice of the case ... "
* Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
1W. VA. CoDE c. 58, art. 2, § 3 (Michie, 1949).
OId. at c. 58, art. 2, § 5 (Michie, 1949).
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The third section, which was combined with the section last
quoted in the older codes, is concerned with errors in a default
judgment or in a decree on a bill taken for confessed and appears
as follows in the Revised Code.
"The court in which there is a judgment by default, or a
decree on a bill taken for confessed, or the judge of such court
in vacation thereof, may, on motion, reverse such judgment
or decree for any error for which an appellate court might
reverse it, if section seven of this article were not enacted, and
give such judgment or decree as ought to be given."3
Section seven, referred to in the section last quoted, applies to
all three of the quoted sections. The portion of it pertinent to the
present discussion is as follows.
"No appeal, writ of error, or supersedeas shall be allowed
or entertained by an appellate court or judge for any matter
for which a judgment or decree is liable to be reversed or
amended, on motion as aforesaid, by the court which ren-
dered it, or the judge thereof, until such motion be made and
overruled in whole or in part ...- 4
These statutes, adopted from the Virginia Code of 1860, have
always been in the W'rest Virginia Code. Presumably, their pres-
ence in the Code and the rationale of their general application
have been familiar to most West Virginia practitioners. Still it
is doubtful whether many, until faced in practice with the neces-
sity of giving them a special study and examining the decisions
construing them, have fully recognized the problems which are
involved in their practical application; although, with the excep-
tion of the first section, which involves the antiquated writ of
error coram nobis, they may appear to be framed in simple terms
and in a fairly familiar background of common law and equity
principles, and so to require no particular effort for interpreta-
tion. Among questions which may arise, depending upon the
occasion, are such as these. What is "clerical error or error in fact"?
What is the nature of a writ of error coram nobis? What is a judg-
ment by default? What is a decree on a bill taken for confessed? Is it
essential that the error appear on the face of the record? What
sort of judgment or decree may be reversed by an appellate court
3 Id. at c. 58, art. 2, § 4 (Michie, 1949).
4Id. at c. 58, art. 2, § 7 (Michie, 1949).
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for error therein? What objects of the statutes suggest their spirit
for purposes of interpretation?
Perhaps the first impression that may come from a study of
the statutes and the decisions construing them will be that answers
to some of these questions had appeared deceptively easy. For
instance, it will be discovered that "judgment by default", as de-
fined by the court for purposes of construing the statute, does not
have the same meaning as in many common law contexts and as
the spirit of the statute seems to require; that a decree pro confesso
does not have the meaning it has under the ordinary equity prac-
tice; and that, while roughly one thinks of a default judgment
and a decree pro confesso as arising from approximately the same
procedural circumstances, the fact is that a judgment by default
and a decree on a bill taken for confessed (using the words of the
statute) bear only a remote analogy to each other as defined by the
decisions construing the statutes.
Confusion in attempts to rely upon the statutes seems to have
arisen from another source. While all three sections are con-
trolled by the same general mechanism, still in many respects they
are antitheses of one another and must be carefully differentiated.
For example, all three sections cover clerical error, or error in fact;
but under two sections the error must appear on the face of the
record, while under the remaining section it need not so appear.
Under only one section can judicial error, or error of law, be cor-
rected and the error must appear on the face of the record. Under
two sections, the possibility of resorting to a motion depends en-
tirely upon the nature of the error; under one section, wholly upon
the nature of the judgment or decree.
An effort will be made in this discussion to analyze briefly the
statutes involved and to review and cite some of the decisions con-
struing them and texts. No attempt will be made to cover all the
details or to review or cite all the decisions. So much, it is hoped,
may be justified by the fact that so far the subject has received only
brief and desultory attention in most of the texts, particularly the
modern ones.
CLERICAL ERROR OR ERROR IN FACT
The propriety of resorting to a motion under the section pro-
viding for a motion in lieu of a writ of error coram nobis, first in
3
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the series quoted above, depends entirely upon the nature of the
error involved. In contrast with the third section quoted, dealing
with error in a judgment by default or a decree on a bill taken for
confessed, the nature of the judgment or decree is wholly im-
material. Operation of the section is circumscribed by only two
limitations: (1) the supposed error committed must be "clerical
error or error in fact" as distinguished from judicial error or error
of law;5 and (2) it must be such as would warrant reversal or cor-
rection of a judgment or decree on a writ of error coram nobis.
The terms "clerical error" and "error in fact," appearing in
the statute, are equivalent in meaning. They are used to designate
that class of errors which is distinguished from judicial error, or
error of law. An error of fact occurs when a judgment is rendered
on the false assumption that a certain fact exists, which, it is as-
sumed, would not have been rendered if the court had been aware
of the nonexistence of the fact. The judgment is wrong, but not
because the court made any erroneous application of the law to
the facts; for the law was properly interpreted and applied to the
facts assumed to exist. Hence no legal error was committed. The
court was not mistaken as to the law, but as to the facts to which
the law was applied. On the other hand, if the court renders an
erroneous judgment when conscious of all the pertinent existing
facts, the error must necessarily result from an improper applica-
tion of the law to the facts, and the error is judicial: In such a
case; there is no mistake as to the facts, and, if there is error, it can
only be one of law. One illustration out of a possible variety may
be selected. It is the law, of course, that a judgment cannot prop-
erly be rendered in favor of a plaintiff who has died before rendi-
tion of the judgment. If a court renders such a judgment, aware
of the fact that the plaintiff is dead at the time, error of law is com-
mitted; because the court consciously acts on the erroneous assump-
tion that a judgment can legally be rendered in favor of a dead
man. On the other hand, if the court renders the judgment on
the false assumption that the plaintiff is alive at the time, only an
error of fact and not an error of law is responsible for the erron-
eous judgment."
5 Yost v. O'Brien, 100 W. Va. 408, 130 S.E. 442 (1925).
6 See 4 MINOR, INSTrITES 849 (1878) and ANDREWS, STEPHEN'S PLEADING 248
(1901), for additional illustrations: defendant dead when judgment rendered;
4
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As to the nature of the clerical errors which may be reviewed
by the now obsolete and somewhat mysterious writ of error coram
nobis (or vobis), Stephen has the following to say.
"Where an issue in fact has been decided, there is (as
formerly observed) no appeal in the English law from its
decision, except in the way of a motion for a new trial; and
its being wrongly decided is not error in that technical sense
to which a writ of error refers. So if a matter of fact should
exist which was not brought into issue, but which, if brought
into issue, would have led to a different judgment, the exist-
ence of such fact does not, after judgment, amount to error
in the proceedings. For example, if the defendant has a re-
lease, but did not plead it in bar, its existence cannot, after
judgment, on the ground of error or otherwise, in any man-
ner be brought forward. But there are certain facts which
affect the validity and regularity of the legal proceeding itself:
such as the defendant having appeared in the suit while under
age by attorney and not by guardian; or the plaintiff or de-
fendant having been a married woman when the suit was com-
menced. Such facts as these, however late discovered and al-
leged, are errors in fact, and sufficient to reverse the judgment
upon a writ of error. To such cases, the writ of error coram
nobis applies, 'because the error in fact is not the error of the
judges, and reversing it is not reversing their own judg-
ment.' ,,7
In contrast with the requirements of the other sections in-
volved in this discussion, it is not fecessary under this section
that errors correctible by a writ of error coram nobis, or by motion
under the statute, appear on the record. In fact, it would seem,
from what has been said and the illustrations given, that they
infant appearing by attorney instead of by guardian; plaintiff or defendant a
married woman when suit commenced.
In Campbell v. Hughes, 12 W. Va. 183 (1877), it was insisted that the
judgment was erroneous because infant defendants had not been represented
by guardians ad litem. The court, at page 211 of the opinion, says: "If any
of the defendants are in fact infants, or were so during the pendency of the
suit, the parties must be remitted to their remedy in such cases provided by
law, by writ of error coram nobis, or motion under section 1, chapter 134, Code
of West Virginia 1868." Accord, Curtis v. Deepwater Ry., 68 W. Va. 762, 70
S.E. 776 (1911).
In King v. Burdett, 28 W. Va. 601 (1886), the complaint was that the
defendant was dead at the time when the judgment was rendered. The court,
at page 609 of the opinion, says: "It is very easy for the personal representative
upon motion under sec. I of ch. 134 of the Code to correct the error. That
section gives an additional remedy to a writ of error coram nobis.
7 ANDREWS, STE'HEN'S PLEADING 247.
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usually would not so appear. On the contrary, the alleged exist-
ence or nonexistence of a fact constituting error may be subject
to dispute and under the common law practice a verdict of a jury
may be necessary in order finally to determine whether there is
error."
In order to understand the full purport of the section under
discussion, it is not only necessary to have an understanding of the
nature of clerical error or error in fact, but also of the nature and
function of the writ of error coram nobis mentioned therein.
A writ of error is the common law method of reviewing a
final judgment of a common law court. Of writs of error, there
are two varieties. One, which has acquired no specific name or
title, is sometimes referred to as the writ of error "generally"; 9 in
other words, it is the ordinary writ of error. It is the one with
which modern practitioners are familiar and with which the
articles in Chapter 58 of the West Virginia Code are concerned.
It has two distinguishing features. One is that by it the judgment
is reviewed by an appellate court, and not by the court which ren-
dered the judgment. The other is that, in this country, the writ
issues from the appellate court which entertains the review. On
the other hand, the writ of error coram nobis (or vobis) contem-
plates a review of the judgment by the court which rendered it,
not by an appellate court; and no writ issues from an appellate
court. The trial court, in effect, sits as an appellate court review-
ing its own judgment. The proceeding acquired its appellation
in the ancient days when writs and pleadings were in Latin. Coram
nobis means "before us," and coram vobis, "before you." The one
or the other phrase was used depending upon the English court in
which the judgment was rendered. The purport of these Latin
words as labeling the writ of error and why the phraseology varied
in the different courts are very well stated in the language of Pro-
fessor Minor.
"The writ of error coram vobis (or nobis) is where the
alleged error consists of matter of fact; the writ of error gen-
erally where it consists of matter of law.
8 "If the adversary does not admit the truth of the fact alleged, (being
extrinsic to the record,) which is the ground of the writ of error, it must be
ascertained by a jury." 4 MINOR, INSTtrr 849. Quaere: Would a jury be
demandable on a motion under the statute?
9 See 4 MINOR, INSTrrrEs 848.
6
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"The former derives its designation from certain words
which were contained in the mandate of the writ itself, when
it -.,o in Latin; which, commanding the court where the pro-
ceeding occurred to inspect the record, and correct the error
found therein, states that the record in question still remains
coram vobis (before you), in the courts of common pleas and
exchequer, and coram nobis, (before us), in the king's (or
queen's) bench where the monarch theoretically presides in
person. It follows, therefore, that in this country, the proper
designation is coram vobis in all cases, our commonwealths
never being present in person, in their courts.'10
In view of this explanation of the purport of the Latin
phrases, it would seem that use in the West Virginia statute of
the words coram nobis, instead of coram vobis, is technically wrong;
although of course the solecism is harmless.
As to the issuing source and purport of the writ, Professor
Minor makes the following statements.
"All writs of error are, in England, as we have seen,
issued out of chancery, and constitute a commission to the
judges named in them, whether of the same or a higher court,
to examine the record, and to affirm or reverse the judgment,
according to law. With us, although, like all other writs, they
are in the name of the commonwealth, yet they issue from the
court which is to revive the proceedings, and consequently,
in the case of writs of error coram vobis, from the court where
the judgment was rendered."1
The functionary who issues the writ is the clerk of the court in
which the judgment was rendered.
12
Presumably, this is the practice which would prevail in West
Virginia if resort should be had to the writ of error coram nobis
(or vobis) for purposes of review. Consequently, we would have
the anomalous situation of the clerk of a trial court at the instance
of a party, albeit in the name of the state, issuing a command in
the form of a writ to the judge of his court directing the judge
to review a judgment rendered by him. The incongruity arises
from the necessity of resorting to a substitute for the English chan-
10 Ibid.
1-4 MINOR, INSTITUTES 849; ANDREWS, STEPHEN'S PLEADING 246; BALLANTINE,
LAw DICTIONARY 1373 (1930). But see BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY 1861 (3d ed.
1933).
12 See 4 MINOR, INSTITUTES 850 for the form of the writ.
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cery as a source for issuing the writ; and, since no executive func-
tionary possesses such power in this country, nor can a superior
court issue this particular writ to an inferior court, as it can in the
case of an ordinary writ of error, the only alternative, in order to
get a writ for purposes of conforming to the established procedure,
is to resort to what may be considered an inferior source, the clerk
of the court in which the judgment is rendered. The necessity for
this procedural distortion is alone sufficient to demonstrate that the
writ of error coram nobis is a misfit in American jurisprudence,
and to explain the adoption of a simpler statutory substitute in
which a notice takes the place of the writ.
It remains to call attention to a feature of the statute itself
which seems to involve an anomaly, if not a contradiction. It will
be noted that the statute not only prescribes a motion as a substi-
tute for the writ of error coram nobis as a common law method
of correcting error in a judgment, but it undertakes to go further
by way of providing that a decree may be reversed or corrected on
motion for any clerical error or error in fact for which a "decree
may be reversed or corrected on a writ of error coram nobis." The
decree mentioned in the statute, of course, is an equity decree. The
whole effect of the statute, interpreted literally, so far as it applies
to equity, rests on the assumption that a writ of error coram nobis
is a proper procedure for reviewing decrees in equity and the
statute provides only for correction of such errors in decrees as
might be corrected by such a writ of error. Yet, presumably, no-
body ever heard of a decree in equity being reviewed by a writ
of error,13 which is strictly a common law device administered by
the common law courts. The result would be that, if the formula
provided by the statute for determining what errors in a decree
may be reviewed on motion is literally applied, in conformity with
the plain language in which it is expressed, there are no errors
in a decree which come within the scope of the statute, and there-
fore none which may be reviewed on motion. Yet, after all, the
statute evinces an intention to provide for correction on motion
of clerical errors or errors of fact in decrees, however unfortunate
is Equity methods of review in the lower court are a bill of review, a
petition for a rehearing, and an original bill in the case of fraud or mistake;
in an appellate court, an appeal, which corresponds to the common law writ
of error.
8
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the method adopted to carry the intention into effect. The con-
tradiction in the statute could have been eliminated and the ap-
parent intent accomplished if the statute had been so worded as
to provide, in effect, that clerical errors or errors in fact in decrees
may be corrected on motion when they are of such a nature that
they could have been corrected on a writ of error coram nobis if
they had occurred in a common law judgment; and possibly this
is the manner in which the statute was intended to be construed.
No case has been observed where the statute has actually been
applied to an equity decree, but its availability for such a purpose
has been suggested in more than one decision.14 Neither decision
nor commentary, so far as investigation discloses, has called atten-
tion to this apparent anomaly in the statute.
The second section quoted also, by its very terms, deals with
clerical error and not with judicial error. 5 It specifically enum-
erates the errors to which it applies and specifies the things which
may be subject to the errors - "any mistake, miscalculation, or
misrecital of any name, sum, quantity or time," things which, it
will be observed, are peculiarly susceptible to clerical error. It is
largely self-sufficient and, except for the necessity of distinguishing
between clerical and judicial error, requires little background for
its interpretation and application. In one respect it is unique.
It provides a definite and somewhat mechanical method for cor-
recting the errors subject to its provisions - reference from one
part of the record or proceedings to another - and no other meth-
od is prescribed. Wherefore it necessarily results that, contrary
to possibilities under the prior section, errors to be corrected under
this section must appear on the face of the record or proceedings.
The chief difficulties in attempts to resort to it have arisen from the
necessity of distinguishing between clerical and judicial errors.
Most of the errors enumerated will, naturally, result from inadver-
tences of the clerk; but, as Professor Minor explains, even the
clerk may commit judicial error.
"The practical question, what are the clerical errors
which may thus be amended in the same court where they
14 See, for instance, Fulton v. Ramsey, 67 W. Va. 321, 325, 68 S.E. 381
(1910), citing several cases, all of which, however, are law cases; and Yost v.
O'Brien, 100 W. Va. 408, Syl. 1 and p. 411, 130 S.E. 442 (1925).
15 Stringer v. Anderson, 23 W. Va. 482 (1884).
9
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occur is sometimes rather embarrassing. It is clear that the
provision was intended to apply exclusively to those inadver-
tencies of the clerk which depend upon a comparison and cal-
culation to be made by him, and which may be safely reformed
by reference to other statements in writing contained in the
proceedings, and not at all to judicial errors growing out of
a mistaken application of the law to the facts, notwithstanding
such mistaken application be made by the clerk alone, and the
court be not directly privy to it; for the clerk acts as the sub-
ordinate, and frequently as the assessor of the judge, in cases
uncontested. The difficulty lies in discriminating, in many
cases, between these two classes of mistakes."' 0
DEFAULT JUDGMENTS AND DECREES PRO CONFESSO
Errors in judgments by default and decrees on bills taken for
confessed are correctible on motion under the third section herein-
before quoted, which for convenience is here quoted again.
"The court in which there is a judgment by default, or a
decree on a bill taken for confessed, or the judge of such court
in vacation thereof, may, on motion, reverse such judgment or
decree for any error for which an appellate court might reverse
it, if section seven of this article were not enacted, and give
such judgment or decree as ought to be given."'
17
It will be observed that the propriety of resorting to a motion
under this section does not depend upon the nature of the error
to be corrected, as under the prior sections, but upon the nature of
the judgment or decree. Clerical errors and errors of law are equally
reviewable. 8 Only two conditions are prescribed: (1) the judgment
must be by default or the decree on a bill taken for confessed; and
(2) the error must be such as would cause a reversal in an appellate
court. Of these requirements, the first has presented more difficul-
ties in its application.
The terms judgment by default and default judgment, which are
equivalents, have different meanings in different contexts. In a nar-
row sense, a default judgment is one rendered against a defendant
who fails to appear to the action. In a broader sense, it is one
rendered against a defendant who fails to make a defense, whether
he appears or not. In this sense, it includes a judgment by nil dicit
(he says nothing), which is a judgment rendered against a de-
164 MINOR, INsTrrUTEs 769 (1878). See idem, 770, for examples.
17 W. VA. CODE c. 58, art. 2, § 4 (Michie, 1949).
18 See Stringer v. Anderson, 23 W. Va. 482, 485 (1884).
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fendant who appears but fails to plead at any stage of the pleadings
when it is his turn to plead. 9 In administering the statute, the
West Virginia court has adopted the narrower concept. The result
is that, if the defendant has in any manner appeared to the action,
his appearance alone, although he afterward suffers a judgment to
go against him by nil dicit, is sufficient to prevent the judgment
from being one by default within the meaning of the statute.
20
Why the court has adopted this narrow concept, when apparently
it was at liberty to adopt the broader one and when, as will appear
later, with an equal opportunity to choose, it took a different
attitude toward equity decrees, logically is not easy to surmise.
It is repeatedly said in the decisions that the object of this
section is to give the trial judge an opportunity to review his own
judgments and decrees rendered under circumstances which invite
error, and so avoid unnecessary resort to appellate relief. It is
emphasized that, when a defendant defaults, the court does not
have the aid of counsel on both sides of the case; there is no contest
which tends to ferret out latent possibilities of error; and the court
does not act with the same deliberation as in a contested case.
Wherefore, if errors are inadvertently committed under such cir-
cumstances, the court, if given an opportunity, is more likely to
correct them than it is to correct errors committed with due con-
sideration and deliberation. 2' All these considerations may con-
stitute valid reasons for making a distinction between contested
cases and cases in which judgments are rendered by default or by
nil dicit; but it is difficult to conceive how they can offer any
adequate justification for a distinction between cases where a de-
fendant has failed to appear and cases where he has appeared but
failed to make a defense. Mere appearance without contest can
render no aid to the court. Possibly a resort to history, if not to
10 "In a strict sense a default judgment is one taken against a defendant
who, having been duly summoned in an action, fails to enter an appearance
in time; but the term is now usually applied where default occurs after ap-
pearance as well as before, although such judgments are also designated 'nil
dicit.' " 49 C.J.S. 324 (1947). See 4 MINOR, INSTITUTES 766, where a judgment
by nil dicit is described as a default judgment.
20 Second National Bank of Morgantown v. Ralphsnyder, 54 W. Va. 231,
46 S.E. 206 (1903).
21 See, for example, Gates v. Cragg, 11 W. Va. 300, 306 (1877); Steenrod's
Adm'r v. Wheeling, P. & B.R.R., 25 W. Va. 13, 137 (1884); Watson v. Wiggin-
ton, 28 W. Va. 533, 551 (1886).
11
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logic, may offer some light upon the situation. Professor Minor
gives the following explanation of the circumstances surrounding
the origin of the statute.
"Prior to 1838, judgments by default of defendant's ap-
pearance, were not within the statute of jeofails, (as they are
included in the statute above cited.) And, therefore, if any
defect, however formal, appeared in them, they were liable
to be reversed therefor, in an appellate court. Hence, as every
judgment must be founded upon a sufficient writ of summons
or arrest, the appellate court, according to the established
doctrine, was obliged to examine the writ which instituted
the suit, with the endorsements thereon, (notwithstanding the
general principle that the writ, except to sustain the proceed-
ings, is not considered a part of the record unless made so by
oyer.) Judgments by default of appearance were pretermitted
from the earlier statutes of jeofails, and the writ was held in
such cases to be part of the record, because it was apprehended
that otherwise, the plaintiff would have it in his power to
perpetrate a fraud upon the defendant, by issuing a writ for
one demand, which the defendant, admitting it to be correct,
would forbear to contest; and then filing his declaration and
obtaining judgment by default of appearance for a much
larger amount. (Hatcher v. Lewis, 4 Rand. 152; Nadenbousch
v. Lane, 4 Rand. 413; Wainwright v. Harper, 3 Leigh 270;
Paine v. Britton, 6 Rand. 102.) Accordingly, it was always
held, in that state of the law, that if the defendant once
appeared (in which case he had an opportunity to inspect the
writ,) although he afterwards suffered judgment to go
against him by nil dicit, (which is also a judgment by default),
yet the statute of jeofails applied to the case, and the writ is
no part of the record. (Bargamin v. Poiteaux, 4 Leigh 422-3.)
"Our statute of jeofails at present avoids the embarrass-
ment alluded to by a general provision, that in all cases of
judgment by default, (that is, not upon issue), the court
wherein the judgment was rendered, or the judge in vacation,
may, on motion, reverse the judgment for any cause for which
before, an appellate court would have reversed it.'
"2
2
Clearly, according to this account, the default judgment which
needed statutory attention was the one based on nonappearance of
the defendant. To what extent, if any, consciousness of this fact
had any influence on construction of the statute does not appear
in any of the decisions examined; but apparently it could very well
02 4 MINOR, INSnTUT.S 765-6.
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have done so. It should not be ignored, however, that Professor
Minor, in the second paragraph quoted above, describes the default
judgment which is the subject of the statute as one "not upon
issue." These words can be taken as indicating either a judgment
on nonappearance or a judgment by nil dicit.
The rule as to what constitutes a judgment by default under
the statute, as established by the decisions, is definite, if not al-
together logical. It seems to have come down through the years
without deviation or question. But establishment of a rule for
determining what constitutes a decree on a bill taken for confessed
under the statute has not been so easy and the decisions have not
been in harmony.
"There is no conflict in the Virginia and West Virginia
decisions as to what is a judgment by default within the mean-
ing of the statute, which we are construing; but our decisions
have not been harmonious as to what is 'a decree on a bill
taken for confessed' within the meaning of the statute.
'23
Under the ordinary equity practice, unmodified by statute
there are three situations where a bill is understood to have been
taken for confessed: (1) when the defendant simply fails to appear;
(2) when he fails to answer after his demurrer to the bill has been
overruled; and (3) when he fails to answer after his plea to the
bill has been overruled, or disallowed, as legally insufficient. 24 The
decree in the first situation, it will be observed, is analogous to a
judgment strictly by default at common law; and in the other two
situations, to a judgment by nil dicit. In all these situations,
failure to file an answer to the bill is the factor which causes the
decree to be one upon a bill taken for confessed. In pursuance of
this concept, a decree pro confesso may be described as a decree in a
case where the defendant has not contested the facts alleged in the
bill, which he can do only by answer, if he has failed to file a plea
or his plea has been held legally insufficient; and the confession
involved is a confession of facts. Whatever the merits of this con-
cept, it has not been accepted in the decisions for purposes of
construing the statute, although at least one minority case seems
to conform to its spirit.2 5
23 Watson v. Wigginton, 28 W. Va. 533, 546 (1886).
S4See 30 CJ.S. 1104 (1942).
25 Steenrod's Adm'r v. Wheeling, P. & B.R.R., 25 W. Va. 133 (1884), over-
ruled later in this respect by Watson v. Wigginton, 28 W. Va. 533 (1886).
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About one proposition there can, of course, be no dispute: if
the defendant has totally failed to appear, the decree must neces-
sarily, under the statute or from any viewpoint, be considered one
on a bill taken for confessed. And at the other extreme, if he has
contested the facts by a plea or answer, it is clear that the bill has
not been taken for confessed. In the middle ground between these
extremes, two possible acts by the defendant may be taken as
working a confession of the bill: (1) a mere appearance, without
making a defense in any respect; and (2) an appearance and, in
addition thereto, assertion of a defense on the law by demurrer,
without any defense on the facts.
In an early case,28 in which a decree was entered against a
defendant after he had appeared, demurred and failed to comply
with a rule to answer the court held that the decree was not on the
bill taken for confessed. Although the opinion is not clear on the
point, the decision seems to rest on the proposition that there can
be no such decree except in a case where the defendant has failed
to appear, thus applying the same rule as in the case of a default
judgment.2 7 However this may be, later cases leave no doubt that
mere appearance, without in some way contesting the relief, will
not preclude a decree on a bill taken for confessed. In fact, it will
appear from cases later cited and discussed that the defendant may
appear and contest the relief at one or more stages of the proceed-
ings and still be in default, within the meaning of the statute, at
other stages.
The real conflict in the decisions arises from a difference of
opinion as to the nature of a decree rendered after a demurrer to
a bill has been overruled and the defendant has failed to answer.
In what seems to be the first case dealing with'the question, Gates
v. Cragg, cited above 2 8 the court, Judge Green speaking, flatly
held, without qualification, that, if the defendant appears and
demurs "no decree can be taken against him as on a bill taken for
confessed" after the demurrer has been overruled. The test ap-
*-%Gates v. Cragg, 11 W. Va. 800 (1877).
V Statements to such effect will be found in later cases. See, for example,
Yost v. O'Brien, 100 W. Va. 408, 411-412, 130 S.E. 442 (1925). It is believed,
however, that in all cases where the statements are made the defendant did
more than merely appear; for instance, he demurred to the bill or otherwise
contested the proceedings.
8 Note 26 supra.
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plied in this case is whether the defendant made a defense, on the
law or on the facts, and not whether the facts were confessed by
failure to answer.
In the next case in which the question is critically discussed,
Steenrod's Administrator v. Wheeling, Pittsburgh & Baltimore
R.R.,29 Judge Snyder speaking, a precisely opposite conclusion was
reached. The court says:
"The mere appearance of the defendant, certainly does
not prevent the bill from being taken for confessed. Technically
a bill heard without plea or answer is a hearing on a bill taken
for confessed and a decree rendered in such case is 'a decree
on a bill taken for confessed.' ,,'
The earlier case, Gates v. Cragg, cited above, which the present case
overrules, is not mentioned in the opinion and the court seems
oblivious of the fact that its holding is in conflict with the prior
decision.
The question came up again for decision some two years later
in Watson v. Wigginton,3' Judge Green again delivering the
opinion. A realization that the two prior cases were in conflict led
to an elaborate review of former decisions and what may be con-
sidered a compromise between the conflicting views. The result
of this compromise seems to be as follows. If errors in the decree
carrying into effect the overruling of the demurrer and granting
relief are such only as result from overruling the demurrer, then
the decree is not a decree on the bill taken for confessed. Conse-
quently, it is appealable directly and no motion to reverse or correct
in the lower court is necessary or proper. On the other hand, if
that decree, or any subsequent decree rendered on matters not
contested by the defendant, contains alleged errors additional and
subsequent to any resulting from overruling the demurrer, to that
extent the decree is upon the bill taken for confessed and, for
purposes of review, a motion in the lower court is prerequisite to
an appeal.
Judge Green in this case, with the entire court in accord, is
still of the opinion that the proper test to be applied is not merely
whether the defendant has filed an answer, but whether he has in
D 25 W. Va. 133 (1884).
2o At 137.
3128 W. Va. 533 (1886).
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any manner contested the procedure out of which the supposed
errors arose, by demurrer, plea, answer or otherwise. In the course
of the elaborate opinion, he indulges in an extended analysis in
which he calls attention to various situations in an equity suit
where, applying the test adopted, some matters all the way from
the filing of the bill to a special commissioner's report may rest
upon the bill taken for confessed and others may not, depending
upon whether or not they were in some manner contested by the
defendant. The views expressed in this analysis seem to have
received uniform approval in subsequent decisions, where they are
referred to as a sort of gospel on the subject, and in some cases have
been carried into actual adjudication. Wherefore, it is believed
that they may be worthy of extended quotation.
"From this review of our cases I draw the following in-
ferences as to the true construction of sections 5 and 6, chapter
184 of the Code, so far as they prohibit an Appellate Court
from entertaining an appeal because of an error in a decree
on a bill taken for confessed, until after a motion to reverse
or annul such decree has been made and overruled by the
court below or by the judge in vacation either in whole or in
part.
"First.-If a party, who is a formal defendant in the bill, has
failed to appear in the court below in any manner either by
filing a plea answer or demurrer, or by filing exceptions to the
report of a commissioner in chancery or a commissioner of sale,
which may be the basis of the decree complained of, and if he
has failed to appear in any other manner, such a defendant
can not appeal to this Court, till he has made a motion in the
court below or to a judge in vacation to reverse or correct the
decree he complains of, and the court below or the judge in
vacation has refused to do so in whole or in part. But in such
case, if any of the defendants having a joint interest with him
in the matter complained of unite with him in the appeal and
have answered the bill, this Court will entertain jurisdiction
of the appeal and reverse or correct, if erroneous such decree,
though no such motion had been made or overruled in whole
or in part before the awarding of the appeal.
"Second.-If a defendant in a bill files no plea or answer
but files a demurrer, simply on the ground that the plaintiff
on the facts stated in the bill is entitled to no relief against
him, and the court below overrules such demurrer and awards
a rule against him to answer the bill at a specified time, and he
fails to do so and a decree is rendered against him, and he
16
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makes no such motion to have it reversed or corrected in the
court below, and he appeals from such decree solely on the
ground that the court rendered any sort of decree against
him, this Court will, though he did not make such motion,
entertain his appeal, because such appeal though in form an
appeal from the last decree is in substance and in reality an
appeal from the decree overruling his demurrer and deciding,
that the plaintiff was entitled to relief on the statements in
the bill against him, and is therefore not to be regarded as a
decree on a bill taken for confessed. But if the appellant in
such case does not confine his appeal to the error committed
by the court in overruling his demurrer simply carried out in
the last decree but insists, that there are in addition thereto
other and independent errors in the last decree against him,
which should be reversed, even though the Appellate Court
held, that the demurrer was properly overruled, this Court
will not entertain such appeal, because, so far as these addi-
tional and independent errors are concerned, this last decree
is to be regarded as a decree on a bill taken for confessed and
can not be reversed by this Court, till a motion to correct it
has been made in the court below.
"Third.-Though, when the defendant, the appellant, has
never in any manner appeared in the court below, any decree
against him whenever rendered will be regarded as a decree
on a bill taken for confessed, and this Court will not enter-
tain his appeal therefrom unless he has first made his motion
to correct it in the court below, yet the reverse of this is not
universally true, and in many cases the decree will be regarded
as one on bill taken for confessed, though he may have ap-
peared in a variety of modes otherwise than by answer, on
which the cause was heard, as, for instance, when he filed an
answer but withdrew it, before the case was submitted to the
court below on the hearing, or when he appeared simply to
consent to a continuance or to a reference of the cause to a
commissioner, and in a variety of other cases which might be
suggested. In such cases he could not appeal from any errors
in such decree, unless he had first moved the court below to
correct the errors in the decree, of which he complains. But
on the other hand, cases may arise, in which the defendant,
the appellant, has filed no answer, and yet his appearance
in other modes and certain actions taken by him in the court
below may prevent decrees rendered against him from being
regarded as within the meaning of this statute decrees on bills
taken for confessed entitling him to appeal therefrom, though
he had made no motion in the court below to reverse or cor-
rect such decrees. Thus if the suit was to subject the real
17
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estate of a decedent to the payment of his debts, and the heirs
filed no answer to the bill, but, after the case had been rc-
ferred to a commissioner to ascertain the debts and assets of
the estate, the heirs of the decedent were to appear and con-
trovert certain debts sought to be proven before the commis-
sioner not specified in the bill, but such debts were on the
evidence allowed by the commissioner, and his action in thc
premises was excepted to by the heirs of the decedent, and
their exceptions were overruled, and the commissioner's re-
port confirmed, and a sale of the decedent's real estate ordered
to be made to pay his debts as ascertained by such report, the
heirs of the decedent could appeal from such decree, though
they made no motion in the court below to reverse or correct
it, as such decree ought not to be regarded as a decree on a
bill taken for confessed, though it would have been so re-
garded, had no exception been taken to the commissioner's
report. And not only is such a decree not regarded as based
on the facts stated in the bill taken as confessed, but the ex-
ceptions filed by the heirs to the commissioner's report over-
ruled by the court answer precisely the same purpose, as a
motion to correct the decree, because it allowed such debts
against the estate; and it would be idle to require such motion
for such purpose to be made after the court had overruled
such exceptions.
"So if in any chancery cause brought to have the de-
fendant's land sold for any cause he filed no answer, and
on the bill taken for confessed his land was decreed to be
sold, and when it had been sold, the defendant appeared and
by exceptions to the report of sale resisted the confirmation
of the sale, because the land had not been properly advertised
or for any other reason, and the defendant's exceptions were
all overruled, and the sale confirmed by a decree of the court,
such decree the defendant might appeal from because of er-
rors in confirming such sale, though he made no motion in
the court, after such decree was entered, to reverse it for these
errors. For though, if he had made no exceptions or appear-
ance, such a decree might have been regarded as a decree on a
bill taken for confessed, yet, if he filed such exceptions, and
they were overruled, it, ought not to be regarded as a decree
on a bill taken for confessed, because it was not based on any
fact stated in the bill treated as confessed or admitted to be
true by the defendant but on facts occurring after the filing of
the bill set out in the commissioner's report, which facts were
not treated by the court as confessed or admitted by the de-
fendant but as controverted by him by his formal exceptions
to such report, which exceptions after consideration were
18
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overruled by the court. In such case it would be idle to re-
quire the defendant, after the decree confirming the sale had
been entered, to move the court to reverse such decree for the
reasons, which he had already in writing urged as reasons why
such sale and report should not be confirmed.
"Other examples of like character might be put in illu-
tration.
"The rule would seem to be, that, if the decree complained
of in the Appellate Court is not based on any of the allegations
of the bill taken as confessed but upon facts not appearing
in the bill but introduced into the cause subsequently to the
filing of the bill and in addition thereto it appears by the
record, that the defendant, the appellant, though he has filed
no answer, has appeared in the cause and expressly objected
to the entering of the decree by the court on these new
facts claimed to have been proven, then such decree ought not
to be regarded as a decree on a bill taken for confessed, and
no motion should be required to be made in the court below
to correct or reverse such decree, before an appeal is allowed
the defendant; for he has in fact done really the same thing
in effect as making such motion, when he objected to the en-
tering of such decree on such alleged facts."
32
All this may seem a far cry from the purport of the statute,
which speaks of "a decree on a bill taken for confessed." It will
be noted that in some of the instances mentioned by the court
where a decree may or may not be one on a bill taken for con-
fessed, depending upon whether or not matters are contested by
the defendant, the facts involved and the issues arising out of
them which may be the subject of a confession are totally discon-
nected from the facts alleged in the bill. It may be a little diffi-
cult to see how a default as to such matters can operate as a con-
fession of the bill. Rather, the result is to interpret and apply the
statute as if it spoke of "a decree on matter taken for confessed;"
or perhaps still more realistically, "a decree based on matter not
contested;" instead of a decree on a bill taken for confessed.
32Id. at pp. 560-563. The analysis is condensed in the syllabus. For some
of the cases approving it in general and illustrating specific applications of it,
see Dent v. Pickens, 61 W. Va. 488, 58 S.E. 1029 (1907); Lamp v. Locke, 89
W. Va. 138, 150-151, 108 S.E. 889 (1931); Yost v. O'Brien, 100 W. Va. 408, 411-
412, 130 S.E. 442 (1925). In the Watson case it was held that, although the
defendant had filed no plea or answer, and therefore was in default as to prior
procedure, his motion for a new trial after a jury had returned a verdict on
an issue out of chancery kept him from being in default as to matters dis-
posed of by the verdict.
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Conceding that a judgment is by default or a decree is on a
bill taken for confessed, still it cannot be reversed or corrected by
motion in the trial court except for "error for which an appellate
court might reverse it." This means that the judgment or decree
must be one which is reviewable on a writ of error or an appeal
in an appellate court.
33
It is beyond the scope of this article to enter into a discussion
of the various circumstances under which a judgment or decree
may be reviewed in an appellate court; for instance, to inquire into
the distinctions between interlocutory and final judgments and
decrees; or how an interlocutory judgment or decree may be re-
viewed on a writ of error or an appeal from a final judgment or
decree; or when an appealable judgment or decree may be re-
viewed on a writ of error or an appeal from a subsequent appeal-
able judgment or decree;3 4 but it may be said, in general, that, with
some statutory exceptions in the Code, a judgment to be reviewed
on a writ of error must be a final judgment and a decree to be
reviewed on an appeal must be a final decree or, under the statute, 8
one adjudicating the principles of the cause. There are, of course,
methods independent of the statute now under discussion for re-
versing or correcting in the trial court interlocutory judgments
and decrees which have not been carried into final judgments or
decrees. It may be noted that apparently a void judgment or de-
cree, which has a peculiar status and may be described as a non-
conformist in many phases of the procedural law, is not a judgment
by default or a decree on -a bill taken for confessed for purposes
of the statute.3 6
Although the statute does not expressly so provide, it is essen-
tial under this section that the errors to be corrected on motion
shall appear on the face of the record.3 7  This requirement results
from the fact that only such errors may be reviewed on a writ of
33 It is said that the trial court in passing on the motion sits as an ap-
pellate court over its own judgment or decree. Citizens National Bank v.
Dixon, 94 W. Va. 21, 29, 117 S.E. 685 (1923); Roush v. Seigrist, 119 W. Va.
712, 714, 197 S.E. 25 (1938).
34See Stout v. Philippi M. Se M. Co., 41 W. Va. 339, 23 S.E. 571 (1895);
Dwight v. Hazlett, 107 W. Va. 192, 201, 147 S.E. 877 (1929).
SSW. VA. CODE c. 58, art. 5, § 1 (Michie, 1949).
36 Johnson v. Wheeler Lumber Co,, 69 W. Va. 539, 72 S.E. 470 (1911). See
11 M. J. 185 et seq.
37 Star Piano Co. v. Burgher, 89 W. Va. 475, 109 S.E. 491 (1921).
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error or an appeal from a default judgment or a decree on a bill
taken for confessed.38 A practical test for determining whether
the errors appear on the record is whether it is necessary to sup-
port the motion with affidavits or some other device exterior
to the record in order to disclose the errors complained of. Such
a necessity necessarily indicates that the errors do not appear on
the record and are of such a nature that they must be reviewed
by some other method than a motion under the statute; generally,
by a motion for a new trial, in a common law action, and a bill
of review or a petition for a rehearing in an equity suit.
While the errors to be reviewed must appear on the record,
this does not mean that they must appear on the face of the
judgment or the decree itself. The process has been held to be
per se a part of the record in a case in which a default judgment
is rendered, together with the return thereon. 9 It is likewise a
part of the record in an equity suit.40 So also, of course, are all
the pleadings, both at law and in equity, all court orders and the
proceedings at rules. 41 Wherefore a default judgment or a decree
on a bill taken for confessed may be reversed on motion because of
substantial defects in the summons or in the return of service,
42
and because of substantial defects in the declaration or bill.43
In the one instance, the motion, in effect, operates as a delayed
motion to quash; in the the other instance, as a delayed demurrer.
ELECTION OF REMEDIES
The fourth section hereinbefore quoted is quoted here again
for purposes of convenience.
rs George v. Zinn, 57 W. Va. 15, 19, 49 S.E. 604 (1905); Horner v. Life,
76 W. Va. 231. 235, 85 S.E. 249 (1915); Belcher v. Tolliver, 111 W. Va. 78, 81,
160 S.E. 567 (1931). See ANDREWS, STEPHEN'S PLEADING 250.
30 New Eagle Gas Coal Co. v. Burgess, 90 W. Va. 541, 111 S.E. 508 (1922).
By W. Va. Acts 1949, c. 96, adding section 32 to art. 3, c. 56, W. VA. CODE, the
process is now a part of the record in all cases without craving oyer.
40 McKinley v. Queen, 125 W. Va. 619, 25 S.E.2d 763 (1943).
41 White v. Toncray, 9 Leigh 347, 351 (Va. 1838).
42 Laidley's Adm'rs v. Bright's Adm'r, 17 W. Va. 779 (1881); Midkiff v.
Lusher, 27 W. Va. 439 (1886); Lynch v. West, 63 W. Va. 571, 60 S.E. 606
(1908).
43 Among many cases that might be cited, see National Exchange Bank of
Steubenville v. McElfish Clay Mfg. Co., 48 W. Va. 406, 37 S.E. 541 (1900);
Morgan v. Ice, 80 W. Va. 273, 92 S.E. 340 (1917); Citizens National Bank v.
Dixon, 94 W. Va. 21, 117 S.E. 685 (1923); Roush v. Seigrist, 119 W. Va. 712,
197 S.E. 25 (1938).
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"No appeal, writ of error, or supersedeas shall be allowed
or entertained by an appellate court or judge for any matter
for which a judgment or decree is liable to be reversed or
amended, on motion as aforesaid, by the court which rendered
it, or the judge thereof, until such motion is made and over-
ruled in whole or in part ...
It will be observed that this section, which covers motions
under all prior sections in the article, forbids only an appellate
court or judge to entertain an appeal, writ of error or supersedeas
until the motion is made in the lower court and overruled in whole
or in part. No restriction is placed on any power possessed by a
trial court to review its judgments or decrees by a writ of error or
otherwise. No limitation is put on use in the trial court of the
writ of error coram nobis mentioned in the section quoted at the
beginning of this article, because such a writ of error is not "allow-
ed or entertained by an appellate court or judge." And, since that
section itself places no limitation on resort to such a writ of error,
merely providing that a judgment or decree may be reversed or
corrected on motion, it would seem that a party in this state may
still resort to this antiquated procedure for purposes of reversing
or correcting a judgment because of clerical error or error of fact,
the writ of error coram nobis and the statutory motion being con-
current remedies.
45
In an equity suit, under the equity practice, an appeal and a
bill of review (which of course is filed and litigated in the lower
court) are concurrent remedies for purposes of reviewing a final
decree because of errors appearing on the face of the record. Under
the statute, if the decree is on a bill taken for confessed, such errors
may be corrected on motion and an appeal is not proper; but
resort may still be had to a bill of review, the motion and the
bill of review being concurrent remedies.40  If a motion is used,
an appeal finally lies from the decree disposing of the motion;
and if a bill of review is used, an appeal lies from the final decree
on the bill of review. Likewise, a motion under the statute and a
petition for a rehearing in an equity suit, which is a proceeding
44W. VA. CoD c. 58, art. 2, § 7 (Michie, 1949).
45 See Campbell v. Hughes, 12 W. Va. 183, 211 (1877); King v. Burdett,
28 W. Va. 601, 609 (1886).
46 Meadow River Lumber Co. v. Smith, 121 W. Va. 14, 1 S.E.2d 169 (1939)
and cases cited.
22
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 1 [1952], Art. 2
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol55/iss1/2
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
in the lower court analogous to a bill of review, are concurrent
remedies.47
All these alternative methods of review, it will be observed,
give the trial court the same opportunity to review its own judg-
ments and decrees as a motion under the statutes, and hence are
in harmony with the purpose of the statutes.
In cases where a common, law or equity method of review
in the lower court is not available, or, if available, is not resorted
to, it is vitally important to determine whether the judgment or
decree is of such a nature as to warrant resort to the statutory mo-
tion. The consequences of relying upon a motion when a writ of
error or an appeal is the proper remedy, and of resorting to a writ
of error or an appeal when a motion is proper, are equally disas-
trous. If a writ of error or an appeal is allowed when a motion
should have been made in the lower court, the writ of error or
appeal will be dismissed as improvidently awarded.48  On the other
hand, if a motion is improperly resorted to in lieu of a writ of
error or an appeal, a judgment or decree sustaining the motion
will be reversed in the appellate court merely because of error
in resorting to the motion and the court will not inquire into the
merits of the original judgment or decree. 49. The only recourse
is, in the one instance, if it is not too late, to go back to the lower
court and make the motion, a writ of error or an appeal lying
upon the judgment or decree on the motion; 50 in the other in-
stance, again if it is not too late, to seek a writ of error or an appeal
on the original judgment or decree. The consequences of having
pursued the wrong remedy might not have been so disastrous in
the days when a party was allowed several years in which to make
the motion or to seek appellate relief, and so had leeway in which
to shift his strategy; 51 but now, when a limitation of eight months
47 Shenandoah Valley National Bank v. Shirley, 26 W. Va. 563 (1885);
Richmond v. Richmond, 62 W. Va. 206, 57 S.E. 736 (1907).
is Dickinson v. Lewis, 7 W. Va. 673 (1874); Hartley & Co. v. Roffe, 12 W.
Va. 401 (1878); Adamson v. Peerce, 20 W. Va. 59 (1882); Forest v. Stephens,
21 V. Va. 316 (1883); Ferrell v. Camden, 49 V. Va. 225, 38 S.E. 581 (1901j;
Moore v. Davis, 70 W. Va. 547, 74 S.E. 670 (1912); Henderson v. Henderson,
103 W. Va. 60, 136 S.E. 605 (1927).
49 Bell v. List, 6 W. Va. 469, 476 (1873); Stringer v. Anderson, 23 W. Va.
482, 486 (1884).
50 Midkiff v. Lusher, 27 W. Va. 439 (1886) ; Morrison v. Leach, 55 W. Va.
126, 129, 47 S.E. 237 (1904).
51 The motion and the appeal limitation periods, for obvious reasons,
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is prescribed in both instances, 52 it will frequently be too late to
resort to the proper remedy after having lost as a result of having
pursued the wrong one. All this may suggest that, when in doubt,
the wise course of action is to pursue both remedies at the same
time, a strategy which will be observed to have been followed in
some of the older cases. This strategy, however, under present con-
ditions, has its limitations. In many cases, depending upon how
late the motion is made after rendition of the judgment or de-
cree, it may happen that the court will not act on the motion un-
til the elapse of eight months after the rendition, in which event
it would be too late to seek appellate relief by a writ of error or
an appeal from the original judgment or decree.
THE PROCEDURE
"Every motion under this article shall be after reasonable
notice to the opposite party, his agent or attorney, in fact or
at law, and shall be within eight months from the date of the
judgment or decree . . .,,1.
Presumably, notice would be waived by appearance to the
motion without objection to lack of notice, as process is waived
by a general appearance to an action or suit; but no case has been
observed where the question arose.
It is said that, since the motion proceeding is a substitute for
a writ of error or an appeal, it should substantially conform to
the requisites of those remedies by way of specifying grounds of
the motion, as specifications of error are brought before an appel-
late court in the petition for a writ of error or an appeal;r but
there has been a difference of opinion as to where the grounds
should be stated. Specifically, the point of controversy has been
whether it is necessary to state the grounds in the notice.
have been kept uniform. Originally, each was five years. W. VA. CODE (1868)
c. 134, § 5 and c. 135. § 2. Through the years, from time to time, they have
been reduced.
52 For many years prior to adoption of the Revised Code in 1931, each
period was one year. Since 1931, the limitations have been eight months.
W. VA. CODE c. 58, art. 2, § 9; id. c. 58, art. 5, § 4 (Michie, 1949).
53 W. VA. CODE c. 58, art. 2, § 6 (Michie, 1949).
54In Moore v. Davis, 70 W. Va. 547, 74 S.E. 670 (1912), there was neither
service of notice nor appearance. The court assumes that appearance would
have dispensed with notice.
55 Slingluff v. Gainer, 49 W. Va. 7, 13, 37 S.E. 771 (1901).
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In the last case cited, a decree on a bill taken for confessed was
rendered against a defendant. At a later term of court, he appeared
and pursued a procedure which the court treated as a motion under
the statute to reverse the decree, but in no way assigned any proper
grounds to support the motion. Judge Brannan, speaking for the
court, says "The invariable practice has been to specify the errors
in the notice;"' 0 but he calls attention to the fact that there has
been a conflict in the Virginia decisions as to the proper practice.
"In Gunn v. Turner, 21 Grat. 382, it is said that the
notice must specify errors. This has, perhaps, been overruled
in Saunders v. Griggs, 81 Va. 506, but, as 1 Barton's Law
Practice 574, asserts, the former decision is clearly the better
one."
5 7
Yet despite these observations indicating a preference for
specification in the notice, the court states what presumably is
intended to be the rule in this state in point three of the syllabus
as follows.
"On a motion to reverse a decree by default, the errors
must be specified in the notice of the motion, or on the record
in the motion, or in a written assignment of errors filed as a
part of the record."
Whether the methods here stated by the court are desirable
alternatives should depend upon the object to be accomplished in
requiring the errors to be specified. If the only purpose is to in-
form the court of the grounds of the motion, then it would seem
that any one of the methods suggested would be adequate; but if
notification of the opposite party before argument of the motion
is also an object, then specification in the notice would seem to be
necessary, unless the written assignment of errors mentioned above
should be served on the party, which does not seem to be contem-
plated. Perhaps, after all, since, as Judge Brannan suggests, the
invariable practice in this state has been to specify the errors in
the notice, the more important question is not where they should
be stated, but how they must be stated; that is, how specifically must
the errors be indicated, a question having particular significance
in one field of error to which the motion applies.
56 At p. 18.
57 rd.
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26 CORRECTION OF ERROR ON MOTION
Perhaps the most frequent ground urged for reversal of a
default judgment or a decree on a bill taken for confessed is error
in the declaration or bill. As heretofore suggested, a motion based
on such a ground is in effect a delayed demurrer. Just as it is said
that the motion procedure, since it is a substitute for a writ of
error or an appeal, should conform to the essentials of those
remedies; so it may be said that, to the extent that it functions as
a substitute for a demurrer, it should embody the essential features
of a demurrer. Prior to adoption of the Revised Code in 1981,
it was necessary to state in a demurrer to a declaration or bill only
that the declaration or bill was insufficient in law.," Perhaps
significantly in that state of the law, it was held that the notice
of a motion to reverse a decree on a bill taken for confessed, be-
cause of errors in the bill, need state only the general ground that
the bill was insufficient; in other words, need conform only to the
requirements of a general demurrer.59 However sound this de-
cision may have been at the time when it was rendered, it would
not seem to be in harmony with the present state of the law.
All demurrers now must state specific grounds;00 which means,
of course, that, if the demurrer is directed at a declaration or bill,
it must specify the errors relied upon to show that the declaration
or bill is insufficient. Clearly this is for the benefit of the de-
murree, in order that he may prepare in advance for argument of
the demurrer. For the same reason, one who must meet a motion
based on insufficiency of a pleading should be entitled to advance
notice of the specific grounds of the motion. If such a require-
ment needs any further justification, it may be suggested that the
party making the motion is in effect a delinquent demurrant, and
therefore is entitled to avoid none of the consequences of a normal
demurrer through his dilatoriness. What may be considered a
badge of this delinquency is the fact that a party making the mo-
tion may be required to give security for costs accrued and to ac-
crue before his motion will be entertained.60
58 W. VA. CODE C. 125, § 28 (Barnes, 1923).
59.Morgan v. Ice, 80 W. Va. 273, 92 S.E. 340 (1917). Quaere: Would this
have constituted a sufficient assignment of error on an appeal, the standard,
as heretofore noted, for assignment of grounds on the motion?
so W. VA. CODE c. 56, art. 4, § 36 (Michie, 1949).
61 State v. American Planograph Co., 96 W. Va. 574, 123 S.E.2d 410 (1924).
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CONCLUSION
It is frequently said in the decisions, referring collectively to
the sections under discussion, that their purpose is to give the trial
court an opportunity to correct error in its own judgments and
decrees, and so to dispense with the necessity of resorting to an
appellate court. Such statements are true as applied to the section
dealing with judgments by default and decrees on bills taken for
confessed, but require qualification as applied to the other two
sections. Such is not at all the object intended to be accomplished
by the section which permits a motion in lieu of a writ of error
coram nobis. As heretofore observed, this writ of error does not
issue from an appellate court and contemplates no review in an
appellate court. Hence the object of the statute is not to dispense
with appellate review, but to provide a method of review in the
lower court as an alternative substitute for the antiquated writ of
error coram nobis. Such statements are only partly true of the
other section dealing with clerical error. While one of its purposes
may be to dispense with a writ of error or an appeal, perhaps its
primary object is to prescribe a method for making corrections.
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